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NOTES 
THE HUNT FOR PRIVACY HARMS 
AFTER SPOKEO 
Matthew S. DeLuca* 
 
In recent years, due both to hacks that have leaked the personal 
information of hundreds of millions of people and to concerns about 
government surveillance, Americans have become more aware of the harms 
that can accompany the widespread collection of personal data.  However, 
the law has not yet fully developed to recognize the concrete privacy harms 
that can result from what otherwise seems like ordinary economic activity 
involving the widespread aggregation and compilation of data. 
This Note examines cases in which lower federal courts have applied the 
Supreme Court’s directions for testing the concreteness of alleged intangible 
privacy injuries, and in particular how that inquiry has affected plaintiffs’ 
suits under statutes that implicate privacy concerns.  This Note proposes that, 
in probing the concreteness of these alleged privacy harms, the courts, 
through the doctrine of standing, are engaging in work that could serve to 
revitalize the judiciary’s long-dormant analysis of the nature of privacy 
harms.  It suggests that courts should look beyond the four traditional privacy 
torts to find standing for plaintiffs who bring claims against entities that 
collect and misuse personal information.  This Note urges courts to make use 
of a nexus approach to identify overlapping privacy concerns sufficient for 
standing, which would allow the federal judiciary to more adequately 
address emerging privacy harms. 
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Americans say they want privacy but are often not quite sure how much 
and seem unwilling to pay for it.1  Millions of people send messages, search 
for information, and post photos using free online services, and frequently 
give up some personal data in these exchanges.2 
As a society that privileges the unhampered flow of information,3 
Americans have long sensed a potential tension between values of free 
 
 1. Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 
14, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9M3-JRQB]; see also Adrienne LaFrance, The Convenience-Surveillance 
Tradeoff, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/ 
01/the-convenience-surveillance-tradeoff/423891/ [https://perma.cc/3PS2-9CTN]. 
 2. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1384–86 (2017); Mark Hachman, The Price of Free:  How Apple, Facebook, 
Microsoft and Google Sell You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-
microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html [https://perma.cc/MQ4P-CYN3]; We Want 
You to Understand What Data We Collect and Use, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/your-
data.html [https://perma.cc/BQL8-6BKU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 3. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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expression and the seemingly deep-rooted desire to have certain areas of life 
remain off limits, not just to government but to prying private parties as well.4  
And even as the internet becomes more solidly imbricated in the routines of 
work and private life, there appears to be some feeling that perhaps people 
are being asked to give up too much of their privacy in the process.5 
This Note examines the way in which these American intuitions—and 
ambivalences—are very much alive and topics of ongoing debates in the 
federal courts.6  The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins,7 a 2016 case in which the Court expounded on the “concreteness” an 
injury must have to merit access to the federal judiciary,8 demonstrates the 
difficulties of this debate and has spurred a new phase in courts’ 
consideration of the nature of privacy harms.  As might be expected, the 
holdings of subsequent cases expose the varied strands, value judgments, and 
doctrinal failures and successes of American privacy law. 
Part I of this Note explores the nature of privacy law in America and the 
doctrine of standing, along with its constitutional roots.  It also outlines the 
development of what has been referred to as the “data economy,”9 a robust 
marketplace built on the collection and processing of massive amounts of 
data by private enterprises.  It begins by providing the background for these 
two complicated and unresolved areas of law, standing and privacy, and casts 
them against the rapid growth of commercial enterprises premised on the 
collection and processing of information.  This Part then demonstrates the 
confrontation between a growing sense10 of potential harms and the Article 
III constraints on what sorts of injuries allow access to federal courts.  It notes 
the judicial skepticism that operates as a restraining influence on the 
development of American privacy law and outlines the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Spokeo. 
 
 4. See Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 139–40; Neil M. 
Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1160 
(2005). 
 5. See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/PY6J-WK7H]. 
 6. Margot E. Kaminski, Standing After Snowden:  Lessons on Privacy Harm from 
National Security Surveillance Litigation, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2017); Bradford 
C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing:  Will the Supreme Court 
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1362–63 (2017). 
 7. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 8. Id. at 1548–49. 
 9. Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data:  Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94 
DENV. L. REV. 145, 147–48 (2016). 
 10. Fifty-five percent of respondents to one survey said they decided not to make a 
purchase online because they were concerned about privacy. Companies That Fail to See 
Privacy as a Business Priority Risk Crossing the ‘Creepy Line,’ KPMG (Nov. 6, 2016), 
https://home.kpmg.com/sg/en/home/media/press-releases/2016/11/companies-that-fail-to-
see-privacy-as-a-business-priority-risk-crossing-the-creepy-line.html 
[https://perma.cc/X2CS-SQJN]; see also Lee Rainie & Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the 
Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-
privacy-and-security-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/9BGR-DPUH] (describing “findings 
suggesting that Americans are becoming more anxious about their privacy”). 
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Part II notes the various ways that lower courts have applied Spokeo to 
reach standing conclusions when plaintiffs bring claims under statutes that 
implicate a privacy interest.  It addresses the manner in which courts have 
analyzed statutory privacy interests in relation to common law causes of 
action when they inspect whether plaintiffs’ alleged privacy injuries are 
sufficiently concrete.  This Part also explores the problems that may arise 
when encouraging courts to explore what this Note refers to as “common law 
analogues”11 in the context of privacy claims. 
The final section, Part III, suggests that the instruction the Supreme Court 
gave in Spokeo to lower courts—to look to “whether an alleged intangible 
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded 
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts”12—may 
provide an opportunity for a reinvigorated judicial approach to privacy 
harms.  This Part—evoking the historical context of American privacy law, 
which has often developed in response to changing technology13—proposes 
that Spokeo could in fact initiate renewed judicial consideration of the nature 
of privacy harms, bringing vitality to a long-stagnant area of American 
jurisprudence.  It considers compelling theories of privacy harm advanced by 
scholars and encourages courts to go beyond the four privacy torts famously 
laid out by William Prosser.14  It suggests that Spokeo leaves room for courts 
to look beyond these four torts to other long-recognized harms by examining 
the place for a nexus approach to identify privacy harms, an approach that 
can already be observed at work in recent district and circuit court opinions. 
I.  PRIVACY AND STANDING:  
BRANDEISIAN BRAIN CHILDREN COLLIDE 
In recent years, and certainly since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Spokeo, privacy concerns and the doctrine of standing—the set of initial 
requirements that plaintiffs must establish to get out of the gate in federal 
court15—appear to have come into conflict.16  Part I.A outlines the rudiments 
of standing, including injury in fact.  Part I.B sketches the development of 
American privacy law over the past nearly 130 years and the more recent 
rapid growth of an economic model for internet businesses based primarily 
on easily collected data.17  Part I.C probes the extent to which American 
 
 11. This phrase for framing the inquiry is borrowed from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017).  
While the phrase is useful, however, it is also somewhat misleading:  Spokeo’s instruction that 
courts may look to traditional bases for lawsuits in assessing concreteness does not restrict 
them to forms of injury recognized at common law. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 12. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 13. Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones:  Commercial 
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 331, 351 (2012). 
 14. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 15. Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 465 (2008). 
 16. Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439 
(2017). 
 17. See Thomas C. Redman, 4 Business Models for the Data Age, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 
20, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/4-business-models-for-the-data-age [https://perma.cc/ 
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judges sometimes exhibit skepticism toward privacy claims.  Part I.D then 
discusses Spokeo in detail and draws out the key portions of the opinion as 
they pertain to plaintiffs who seek to bring statutory privacy claims in federal 
court. 
A.  What Is Standing? 
In its simplest formulation, standing doctrine demands that plaintiffs who 
seek to avail themselves of the power of a federal court must, at a minimum, 
satisfy three requirements before the court will consider the merits of their 
claims18:  (1) they must have suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent,” (2) the injury must be traceable to 
the allegedly unlawful conduct of the defendant, and (3) the injury must have 
the potential to be effectively redressed by a favorable outcome in the court.19  
These three elements constitute an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” a 
“core component of standing.”20  Challenges to standing can be brought at 
any time in the course of a suit in federal court because they implicate the 
court’s jurisdiction over the claims.21  This Note will only consider the first 
of standing’s requirements, injury in fact, which was at issue in Spokeo and 
which, for now, poses a significant hurdle for privacy plaintiffs.22 
Part I.A.1 below discusses the development of the doctrine of standing.  
Part I.A.2 particularly examines the requirement of injury in fact. 
1.  Development of the Doctrine 
In explaining its rationale for demanding standing for all cases brought in 
the federal courts, the Court has said that the three elements of standing are 
required by the Constitution.23  The Court has stated that the requirements of 
standing emanate from Article III’s limitation of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”24  The doctrine is justified as 
 
6LUG-SGKU]; Douglas Rushkoff, When the Data Bubble Bursts, Companies Will Have to 
Actually Sell Things Again, FAST COMPANY (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3059722/when-the-data-bubble-bursts-companies-will-have-
to-actually-sell-things-again [https://perma.cc/C9AP-8BB7]. 
 18. Gregory R. Manring, Note, It’s Time for an Intervention!:  Resolving the Conflict 
Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2535–37 (2017). 
 19. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also William A. Fletcher, 
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (“The essence of a true standing 
question is the following:  Does the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial enforcement of an 
asserted legal duty?”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers:  A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 395 (1996). 
 20. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
 22. See Eric S. Boos et al., Damages Theories in Data Breach Litigation, 16 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 125, 126 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for 
Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 539 (2017); Lexi Rubow, Standing in the Way 
of Privacy Protections:  The Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for 
Constitutional and Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1007, 1011–12 
(2014). 
 23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 
(2016). 
 24. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–61. 
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a necessary safeguard to ensure that cases are brought in a genuinely 
adversarial setting that draws in the proper disputing parties, as a check 
against generalized grievances and advisory opinions, and as a means to 
ensure that the federal judiciary does not overstep its proper role or impinge 
on the powers of the elected branches.25 
While the Court has sometimes spoken in conclusive tones about the 
elements of standing, at other times it has seemed much more uncertain about 
whether the outlines of standing can be definitively articulated.26  While 
scholars dispute the extent to which standing has always, under other names, 
been an aspect of Article III jurisdiction,27 it seems clear that standing as the 
Court understands it today developed in the early twentieth century and is at 
least partly attributable to the judicial innovations of Justice Louis 
Brandeis.28  While standing doctrine may frequently be viewed today as a 
judicially imposed barrier for plaintiffs,29 it began its modern history as a 
check on judges, a mechanism to make it harder for the Court to strike down 
democratically enacted statutes amid the growth of the regulatory state.30 
It was Justice Brandeis who, in 1922, wrote for the Court in Fairchild v. 
Hughes,31 a case in which a plaintiff sought to have the Nineteenth 
Amendment declared unconstitutional.32  The Court found that the plaintiff’s 
claims did not “afford a basis for [the] proceeding.”33  What is now 
recognized as the first of the three elements of standing, injury in fact, does 
not appear explicitly in Fairchild.  A case decided one year later, 
 
 25. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 222. 
 26. Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that “the core component of standing is an 
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement”), with Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) (declaring that “[g]eneralizations 
about standing to sue are largely worthless as such”), and Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (observing that “[w]e 
need not mince words” in saying that the Court has not defined Article III standing “with 
complete consistency”). 
 27. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 
1064–65 (2015); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 224–26; F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-
Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 679–80 (2017); Laveta Casdorph, Comment, 
The Constitution and the Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 471, 
479–81 (1999). 
 28. “[T]he modern doctrine of standing is a distinctly twentieth century product that was 
fashioned out of other doctrinal materials largely through the conscious efforts of Justices 
Brandeis and Frankfurter.” Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of 
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1988); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, 
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 291 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1437 (1988). 
 29. Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons:  What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs 
Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 563–86 (2012). 
 30. Id. at 557; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 
1767 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?:  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179–80 (1992). 
 31. 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
 32. Id. at 127. 
 33. Id. at 129. 
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Frothingham v. Mellon,34 is generally pointed to as the first modern standing 
case.35 
The Court in Frothingham faced, in part, a taxpayer challenge to the 
Maternity Act, which directed funds to the states with the purpose of 
improving health care and reducing mortality rates for mothers and 
newborns.36  The civilian plaintiff alleged that the additional taxes to support 
the Act would “increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take her 
property without due process of law.”37  Stating that the Court had never 
before directly decided this issue, and that the question had theretofore passed 
“sub silentio” or that the determination of it had been “expressly withheld,”38 
the Court held that taxpayer status alone was not sufficient to present a 
justiciable issue.39  Grounding its reasoning on a separation-of-powers 
rationale, the Court said that it may “review and annul acts of Congress” as 
violations of the Constitution only when a plaintiff alleged “some direct 
injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue.”40 
2.  Injury in Fact 
The first Supreme Court case to explicitly demand injury in fact as a 
requirement for standing was Ass’n of Data Processing Service 
Organizations v. Camp.41  The petitioners in that case were in the business 
of selling data-processing services.42  The Court declared that the primary 
question in determining whether a plaintiff has established standing is 
whether the plaintiff alleges an “injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”43  
This injury-in-fact requirement has remained a basic element of the Article 
III standing analysis ever since it developed within the administrative law 
context presented in Data Processing.44 
Since injury in fact’s full-fledged arrival in Data Processing, judges have 
had to determine what sorts of injury should even be visible to the 
discriminating eye of the judiciary.45  Scholars have argued that Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s formulation of injury in fact as laid out for the Court in 
 
 34. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 35. Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the 
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 427–28 (2009); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing 
Alone:  Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 309 n.35 
(1996). 
 36. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479. 
 37. Id. at 486. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 488. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see id. at 152; Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized 
Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 237 n.79 (2008); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 230. 
 42. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. 
 43. Id. at 152. 
 44. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 230. 
 45. Courtney M. Cox, Risky Standing:  Deciding on Injury, 8 NE. U. L.J. 75, 94–95 (2016). 
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife46 tightened the requirements47 by providing 
that a congressional grant of standing, in this case in the Endangered Species 
Act, was inadequate for Article III purposes.48 
B.  The Evolving Nature of Privacy Harms 
Theoretical justifications for privacy law have ranged from “the right to be 
let alone” to a right to control information about one’s self.49  The task of 
defining the harm has an important role in privacy law.50  Part I.B.1 discusses 
the development of privacy law in America, and Part I.B.2 explores the 
growth of an economic model dependent on the acquisition of data.  Part I.B.3 
introduces the challenges that face privacy plaintiffs attempting to secure 
standing in federal court. 
1.  The Path of American Privacy Law 
The very idea of privacy law has a decidedly “uneven history” in 
America.51  While the common law privacy torts form an important part of 
the story of American privacy law,52 the federal court system, and in 
particular the Supreme Court and its Justices, has been intimately involved 
in concerns about privacy, and technological encroachments upon it, for more 
than a century.53  It was future Supreme Court Justice Brandeis who, along 
with Samuel Warren, penned the 1890 Harvard Law Review article54 that 
 
 46. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 47. Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”:  Intangible Injury in Fact in the 
Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 750 (2016); Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, 
Forests, and Fallacy:  An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding Standing in Procedural 
Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 185 (2006).  In a law 
review article published before he became a Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia argued 
that standing doctrine is a “crucial and inseparable element” of the principle of separation of 
powers. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983).  Scalia wrote that standing achieves this 
by enforcing a boundary “restricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority 
rather than majority interests.” Id. at 895.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who wrote in Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), that “the law of Art[icle] III standing is built on a single basic 
idea—the idea of separation of powers,” id. at 752, joined Justice Harry Blackmun’s Lujan 
dissent, which criticized Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for its “anachronistically formal 
view of the separation of powers,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 48. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:  Standing as a Judicially 
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1172–73 (1993). 
 49. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–111 (2002). 
 50. Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877, 889 (2000). 
 51. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 432 (2017). 
 52. Don Corbett, Virtual Espionage:  Spyware and the Common Law Privacy Torts, 36 
U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2006). 
 53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (asking “what limits there are upon this 
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”); United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler 
of human privacy ever known.”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, 
C.J., concurring) (“[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute 
a great danger to the privacy of the individual.”). 
 54. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890) (citing “[r]ecent inventions and business methods” as motivating a need for legal 
recognition of privacy concerns). 
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“[o]ut of a few scraps of precedent . . . invented a brand-new tort, invasion of 
privacy.”55  Brandeis would weave his developing vision of privacy into his 
opinions once on the Court.56  For example, in his famous dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States,57 a prohibition-era wire-tapping case, Brandeis 
forewarned of the invasions of privacy that could come with “[a]dvances in 
the psychic and related sciences [that] may bring means of exploring 
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”58 
Seventy years after Warren and Brandeis published their article, famed 
torts scholar William Prosser set out to map the spread of the right they 
identified and reviewed more than three hundred cases that had arisen in the 
intervening decades.59  Prosser announced that the law of privacy was made 
up of four interests that could be invaded in four distinct ways:  (1) intrusion 
upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light, and (4) 
appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness.60 
The law has never quite gone so far as to fully enforce what Warren and 
Brandeis referred to as “the right ‘to be let alone.’”61  Privacy law such as it 
exists in the United States today consists of a mix of federal and state statutes, 
along with common law torts.62  Privacy statutes tend to be scattered and of 
limited scope.63  The small handful of federal statutes targets a range of 
specific privacy concerns and includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
(FCRA),64 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),65 
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA),66 and the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).67  Many states have either 
codified the privacy torts in statute or recognize them under common law.68 
The law has long identified a tension between the desire to enforce a zone 
of personal privacy and other core principles of American law, including the 
First Amendment.69  Privacy has nestled most comfortably into the law where 
 
 55. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 548 (1973); see also Ken 
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (describing Justices 
Warren and Brandeis’s handiwork as “light on hard precedent, but full of optimism”). 
 56. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
1295, 1331 (2010). 
 57. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967), and 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 58. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 59. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Prosser, supra 
note 59, at 389. 
 61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 195. 
 62. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2006). 
 63. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 
881 (2003) (stating that statutes “address specific elements of fair information practices”). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 67. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012). 
 68. Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law:  A Framework 
for the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 105 (2002). 
 69. See John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 16, 26–28 (2012); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment:  A 
Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 132–33 (2000). 
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it protects individual interests against government power,70 and so the Court 
has spoken out more forcefully for individual privacy in the context of Fourth 
Amendment rights.71  There, the assertion of privacy rights has sat more 
agreeably alongside interests that Anglo-American law has thoroughly 
metabolized, such as the sanctity of the home72 and the right to be free from 
“unreasonable governmental prying.”73  The Court has observed that “a 
person’s general right to privacy . . . is, like the protection of his property and 
of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”74 
The reluctance of the law to fully embrace privacy has been given 
expression by some scholars and jurists who argue that the costs of privacy 
are too high.75  Privacy is seen, in many instances in which it is asserted, as 
little more than a desire that others not obtain information that one would 
rather others not possess.76  Critics of asserted privacy rights contend that 
keeping privacy protections out of the law, or keeping such protections very 
narrowly tailored, has social benefits, including protecting broad freedom of 
expression77 and allowing increased economic uses of information.78  Indeed, 
one scholar has argued that the relative absence of American privacy laws 
may have been an important condition for the development of the commercial 
internet.79  A counterpoint is provided by both the experience of European 
nations (which tend to have both an active internet and stricter privacy 
regulation) and independent research that indicates that the lack of privacy 
protections may make individuals reluctant to use the internet.80 
 
 70. “To Americans, the starting point for the understanding of the right to privacy is of 
course to be sought in the late eighteenth century, and especially in the Bill of Rights . . . .” 
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1151, 1211–12 (2004).  “In particular, ‘privacy’ begins with the Fourth Amendment:  At 
its origin, the right to privacy is the right against unlawful searches and seizures.” Id. at 1212. 
 71. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 115–16 (2008). 
 72. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
 73. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
 74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). 
 75. See BENJAMIN WITTES & JODIE C. LIU, THE PRIVACY PARADOX:  THE PRIVACY 
BENEFITS OF PRIVACY THREATS 8 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Wittes-and-Liu_Privacy-paradox_v10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERK9-XT2Y]; Richard 
A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978); Kent Walker, The Costs of 
Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 88 (2001) (“[L]aws regulating privacy chill the 
creation of beneficial collective goods and erode social values.”). 
 76. Grant Gross, Judge:  Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PCWORLD (Dec. 4, 
2014, 1:46 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-
to-digital-data.html [https://perma.cc/ZV5S-GSJB] (quoting Judge Posner as stating that 
“[m]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just trying to conceal the disreputable 
parts of your conduct”). 
 77. See Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 51 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Information Privacy:  The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking 
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000). 
 78. Walker, supra note 75, at 88. 
 79. See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 667 (2014) 
(describing “[t]he absence of privacy constraints” as “especially conducive to [i]nternet 
innovation”). 
 80. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure:  Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite 
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2014); Will Yakowicz, Two-Thirds 
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2.  The Growth of the Data Economy 
Information, even of imperfect quality, has long been valuable, even if it 
has not always been understood as a commodity.81  The expansion of credit-
reporting agencies in the late nineteenth century struck some contemporary 
observers as an extremely worrisome form of public snooping.82  The 
development of the commercial internet made the collection and aggregation 
of information on a mass scale simpler and more lucrative.  Today, personal 
data is gathered, mined, and marketed by companies large and small on a 
regular basis.83  Household-name companies like Google and Facebook, as 
well as smaller enterprises,84 hold vast troves of data, which power an 
economy premised on the collection of personal information.85  With those 
stores of data comes a risk of disclosure, whether as the result of a hack or 
other form of breach,86 as well as the possibility that a company or other 
entity may make use of the collected data in an unlawful manner. 
 
of Customers Are Worried About Security While Shopping Online, INC. (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/survey-66-percent-customers-worried-id-theft-
shopping-online.html [https://perma.cc/VS3U-XZ3W].  
 81. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 86 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1996) 
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(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/mass-surveillance-
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tap-big-data-if-they-know-where-to-look [https://perma.cc/5YYB-FRS3]. 
 85. See Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 71, 71 (2016); Cate, supra note 50, at 888–89; Franks, supra note 51, at 454 (“Cell 
phone carriers, social media applications, and search engines now possess huge troves of user 
information.”); Sheri B. Pan, Note, Get to Know Me:  Protecting Privacy and Autonomy Under 
Big Data’s Penetrating Gaze, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 239, 245 (2016) (“As more collection 
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Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing the “data-collecting 
infrastructure” of the internet that “hums along quietly in the background”); In re Google, Inc. 
Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) 
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About You, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-
world-selling-data-about-you-464789 [https://perma.cc/F3A2-2ZCX]. 
 86. See Selena Larson, The Hacks That Left Us Exposed in 2017, CNN (Dec. 20, 2017, 
9:11 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/biggest-cyberattacks-of-the-year/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/KK8P-GGGS]. 
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Whether individuals use smartphone applications,87 go out to eat at 
popular restaurants,88 or wear certain activity-tracking devices,89 private 
persons, if they want to avail themselves of the promises of new technologies, 
often have little choice90 but to hand over a variety of detailed information, 
such as their social security numbers and dates of birth, as well as potentially 
more intimate details—including their location91 or searches they conduct 
over the internet92—to companies that may profit off that information. 
With the growth of the commercial internet, companies realized a potential 
to gather more information for profitable use.93  DoubleClick, for example, 
emerged in the late 1990s and became the internet’s dominant advertising 
service by offering targeted ads based on profiles the company built of 
internet users.94  Today, individuals effectively pay for some of the world’s 
most popular online services by handing over information about 
themselves.95  The collection of data has gone beyond the accumulation of 
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2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/04/when-apps-collude-to-steal-
your-data/522177/ [https://perma.cc/7QN8-ZCQD]. 
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Our Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
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details like names, addresses, and social security numbers; companies can 
pan through a flood of videos, photos, social media postings, location 
information, and other sources of data generated through the use of 
technology.96  This constant flow of information, and the insights and 
revenues it can generate for businesses, has led to data being described as the 
“oil” of the modern economy.97 
Recognizing this potential, businesses have for years identified their data 
stores as among their most prized assets.98 
3.  A “Kilimanjaro” for Privacy Plaintiffs? 
While the expansion of this fecund data economy has met little legal or 
political resistance,99 plaintiffs who have brought claims under a statute 
alleging privacy-right violations in federal court have sometimes faced an 
uphill battle.100 
Standing doctrine has long been most comfortable with “tangible” injuries:  
the economic, physical, or other harms that the legal community of lawyers 
and judges can label and assess.101  But the necessity of a “concrete, living 
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N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulating-
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 101. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries 
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contest between adversaries”102 has not prevented standing doctrine from 
recognizing intangible harms as valid for Article III purposes. 
While the intangibility of alleged privacy harms may often count against 
them, some commentators have noted, by way of comparison, the way 
intangible harms—implicated in torts such as loss of consortium or breach of 
confidence—are routinely recognized by the courts.103  One prominent past 
recognition of standing for an intangible injury was in FEC v. Akins,104 in 
which the Court said that the denial of information to which the plaintiffs 
were entitled under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) constituted 
injury in fact.105  And the Court in Spokeo cited free speech and free exercise 
cases to support its reaffirmation of the principle that intangible injuries can 
be sufficiently concrete.106 
At the same time, the bar for privacy harms appears to be elevated.107  One 
scholar has perceived a shift away from asking “whether the plaintiff before 
the court [is] the right plaintiff” to asking whether “the harm caused by the 
defendant is the right kind of harm.”108  The move toward questioning the 
cognizability of some alleged privacy harms was occurring in the lower 
courts before Spokeo.109 
C.  Judicial Skepticism of Privacy Harms 
Courts before Spokeo were already weighing the many ways in which 
plaintiffs allege data-related privacy harms.110  For example, there currently 
exists a circuit split that developed before Spokeo on whether a plaintiff can 
allege as a cognizable injury in fact the increased future risk of identity theft 
after a data breach.111  In reviewing the development of privacy as a legal 
concern in the United States, commentators have noted the way in which the 
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 102. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460.  
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Citron, Risk and Anxiety:  A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 756 (2018); 
see also Wu, supra note 16, at 439. 
 104. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 105. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:  Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 638 (1999). 
 106. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 
(2009); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). 
 107. Kaminski, supra note 6, at 416. 
 108. Wu, supra note 16, at 439. 
 109. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011); Wu, supra note 16, at 447. 
 110. Solove & Citron, supra note 103, at 744 (observing that for some judges “recognizing 
data-breach harms is akin to attempting to tap dance on quicksand, with the safest approach 
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 111. Compare Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that the 
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accretive processes that have contributed to privacy law have often been 
catalyzed by radical upsets in technology and society.112 
At the same time, while noting this hesitancy in the legal community, it is 
wrong to suggest that American judges, or the citizenry for that matter, are 
indifferent to privacy concerns.113  It may be that the judiciary’s reluctance 
to jump to recognizing privacy harms is, at least in part, bound up in the way 
in which privacy wended its way into American law in the first place. 
The word “privacy” appears nowhere in the Constitution.114  Causes of 
action against, for example, eavesdropping (alongside extrajudicial self-
remedies, such as dueling) provided some protection in preconstitutional 
America for what may be understood today as privacy interests.  The famous 
1763 case Wilkes v. Wood115 captured the colonial imagination as a 
paradigmatic instance of unlawful government intrusion.116  Since then, one 
scholar has summed up some of the privacy interests embedded in the 
Constitution as including, among others, protections for personal religious 
practices, private property, and some economic activity.117  The Court has 
recognized that the Constitution provides protections for personal privacy 
against intrusion by the government.118 
The privacy torts as they are recognized today are another matter.  Neil 
Richards and Daniel Solove have pointed to the pivotal role that Prosser 
played in systematizing and raising the status of the privacy torts as a prime 
factor in privacy law’s relative nonresponsiveness to social change over the 
decades since Prosser’s article.119  While Prosser’s review of hundreds of 
cases implicating privacy, which led to his sorting them into four cognizable 
privacy torts, played a hugely influential role in gaining legitimacy for 
privacy as a distinct legal interest,120 it also may have sapped the “generative 
and creative energy sparked by the Warren and Brandeis article,” leaving 
privacy to calcify in the face of the technological changes of recent 
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decades.121  But Prosser alone cannot bear the blame for the judiciary’s 
skeptical approach to privacy concerns.122  His privacy torts have cast their 
long shadow because courts, Richards and Solove argue, enthusiastically 
embraced Prosser’s categories and “stopped engaging in the dynamic 
creative activity” that had accompanied earlier judicial exploration of alleged 
privacy harms.123 
But judges have also found ways to view privacy harms that are more in 
keeping with traditional notions of what an injury should look like.  So, for 
example, some courts have felt comfortable reaching for a decrease in a 
smartphone’s battery charge as an adequate injury when a plaintiff alleged 
that a party’s data-collection activities caused their phone battery to drain 
more rapidly.124 
Some privacy concerns have also long been seen as conflicting with First 
Amendment values.125  If enthusiasts say data are the oil of the information 
economy, then the free exchange of facts and opinions is the oil of a vibrant 
democratic republic.126 
Richards argues that, even for Brandeis, the organization of the tort law of 
privacy seems to have been a secondary concern over the course of 
Brandeis’s wide-ranging career—less important than what the Justice saw as 
the socially salubrious “duty of publicity.”127  Richards suggests that, as his 
thought matured, Brandeis himself grew to favor a conception of privacy 
founded on the Constitution and not on tort—a form of “intellectual 
privacy.”128  This conceptualization supported, rather than undermined, First 
Amendment values by “protect[ing] individuals’ emotional and intellectual 
processes so that they can think for themselves.”129 
D.  Spokeo and Its Holding 
Part I.D.1 outlines the key portions of the Supreme Court’s Spokeo 
decision.  Part I.D.2 provides background on what the parties to the case and 
amici curiae saw at stake in Spokeo.  Last, Part I.D.3 asks what, if any, change 
Spokeo brought about in federal standing doctrine. 
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1.  The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Supreme Court decided Spokeo in May 2016.130  The much-
anticipated131 case arose from claims brought by the plaintiff, Robins, under 
the FCRA.132  Spokeo runs a website that can be used to generate reports on 
individuals by gathering information including age, address, and data on 
more personal matters, including income.133  Robins alleged that Spokeo 
maintained a report on him that contained numerous inaccuracies and that 
Spokeo thereby was in violation of FCRA.134 
Robins brought claims under the FCRA provisions that provide that 
consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports135 and that 
[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the 
Act] with respect to any [individual] is liable to that [individual] for, among 
other things, either “actual damages” or statutory damages of $100 to 
$1,000 per violation, costs of the action and attorney’s fees, and possibly 
punitive damages.136 
The Supreme Court did not directly address the question “[w]hether 
Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no 
concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction 
of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare 
violation of a federal statute.”137  The Court instead held that the Ninth 
Circuit erred by finding standing based on Robins’s alleged particularized 
injury and by failing to consider whether the injury was also concrete.138 
2.  Disagreement over What Was at Stake in Spokeo 
Amicus briefs filed in Spokeo by privacy groups and members of private 
industry took different views on the nature of the data-driven activity at issue 
in the case.  Privacy advocates, as well as the U.S. Solicitor General,139 
argued that the FCRA’s private right of action played an important role in 
regulating the uses companies make of the data that they collect.140 
Industry voices, on the other hand, foresaw a rush of “no-injury class 
action lawsuits” that “could threaten nearly every aspect of the U.S. 
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economy.”141  Google, Yahoo!, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Netflix were among 
the technology companies that signed on to a brief in which they argued that 
their businesses were “uniquely vulnerable to the untoward consequences of 
the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of Article III.”142  The amici noted that their 
“successful innovations and use of easily replicated computer processes 
allow billions of people to benefit from the valuable services and products 
they provide, usually at little or no cost to consumers.”143  In another brief, 
amici media companies argued that a strict injury-in-fact line would help 
ward off abusive class action suits.144 
3.  Did Spokeo Change Anything? 
One legal observer described the Court’s narrow holding in Spokeo as 
“somewhat of a disappointment.”145  At least some courts have not been 
convinced that Spokeo represents a substantial shift in the Supreme Court’s 
standing jurisprudence.146  One circuit assessed Spokeo’s influence as casting 
a renewed focus for courts on examining subject matter jurisdiction when it 
appears that a plaintiff may be alleging merely a bare procedural violation of 
a statute.147  One district court has described Spokeo as laying out a 
“blueprint” for assessing the concreteness of an alleged injury but said that 
the Supreme Court’s opinion merely had recited standard conceptions of the 
injury-in-fact requirement.148  Another district court summed up Spokeo as 
“offer[ing] useful guidance.”149  These differing conceptions about precisely 
what Spokeo means, and whether or not it develops pre-existing law, appear 
to be Spokeo’s most significant short-term legacies.150 
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II.  COURTS SEARCH FOR PRIVACY HARMS AFTER SPOKEO 
While the case was only decided in 2016, one result of Spokeo now seems 
assured:  it introduced fresh layers of confusion in an area of the law—
privacy claims—that was already rife with uncertainty.151  A string of cases 
decided in both the circuit courts of appeals and the federal district courts 
since Spokeo have addressed standing challenges that arose after plaintiffs 
brought claims pursuant to a statute that implicated a privacy concern.152 
Part II details significant cases that have been decided since Spokeo and 
examines the way in which they follow the Supreme Court’s suggestions to 
test the concreteness of intangible injuries.  Part II.A looks at the privacy 
interests courts have and have not recognized as legitimate for standing 
purposes.  Part II.B then explores some of the subtleties that can arise in 
courts’ comparisons to analogous harms.  Finally, Part II.C uses the Eighth 
Circuit’s decisions in Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc.153 and 
Heglund v. Aitkin County154 to investigate the different ways courts may 
frame seemingly similar injuries to different results in the standing analysis. 
A.  What Privacy Interests Are Courts Protecting? 
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court held that Robins could not prevail on the 
basis of a “bare procedural violation.”155  The Court went on to say that “not 
all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm” and gave 
the example of an inaccurate zip code to illustrate a harmless privacy 
violation.156  The Court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the 
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any 
concrete harm.”157 
The Supreme Court stated that “both history and the judgment of Congress 
play important roles” and instructed lower courts to look to both of these 
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sources of guidance when faced with alleged intangible injuries.158  
Harkening back to the case-or-controversy requirement, the Court noted, “[I]t 
is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis 
for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”159  It continued, “Congress is 
well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 
requirements” and so “its judgment is also instructive and important.”160 
Part II.A.1 lays out cases where the courts have denied standing and have 
held that the plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient injury.  Part II.A.2 then 
presents cases where courts have found standing, at least in part, by 
analogizing the plaintiff’s alleged injury to one that has been historically 
recognized by the courts, usually in the common law, and frequently to one 
of the privacy torts.   
1.  Requiring More Than a Statutory Violation 
Lower courts have followed Spokeo’s instructions in cases in which they 
have found that the plaintiffs had not suffered any concrete harm, despite the 
alleged violation of a statute as to that individual plaintiff.  In one such case, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that plaintiffs had 
not adequately established standing for alleged violations of Washington 
D.C.’s Use of Consumer Identification Information Act and its Consumer 
Protection Procedures Act.161  The two plaintiffs had made purchases at local 
clothing stores and, while at the register, were each asked for their zip codes, 
a request that they alleged violated statutory protections against requiring 
address information to complete their transactions.162  The court denied 
standing and noted that neither of the plaintiffs alleged any harm, such as 
invasion of privacy or emotional injury, beyond the “naked assertion that a 
zip code was requested and recorded.”163 
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Meyers v. Nicolet 
Restaurant of De Pere, LLC,164 where the court heard allegations under the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA).165  The plaintiff, 
Meyers, received a receipt after dining at the defendant-restaurant that did 
not have the credit card expiration date properly truncated as required by 
law.166  The Seventh Circuit reviewed the claims in light of the Court’s 
holding in Spokeo, stated that the inclusion of the full expiration led to no 
“appreciable risk of harm,” and concluded that Meyers’s alleged injuries 
were insufficient to confer standing.167  The Seventh Circuit did not say that 
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2018] THE HUNT FOR PRIVACY HARMS 2459 
such a violation of FACTA could never satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
but stated that the plaintiff’s allegations were “completely divorced from any 
potential real-world harm.”168 
The Second Circuit similarly held that standing did not exist in a pair of 
FACTA cases, Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette America, Inc.169 and 
Katz v. Donna Karan Co.170  In Paris Baguette, the plaintiff brought suit after 
she received a receipt that displayed her credit card’s full expiration date;171 
in Katz, decided three months after Paris Baguette, the plaintiff alleged that 
he received a receipt that improperly displayed the first six digits of his credit 
card number.172  In Paris Baguette, the Second Circuit said that it was joining 
the Seventh Circuit’s result in Meyers and held that printing “an expiration 
date on an otherwise properly redacted receipt” does not satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement.173  In Katz, the court held that the court below had not 
erred in finding that the alleged FACTA violation did “not increase the risk 
of real harm” and so was not sufficient to establish standing.174 
Outside the FACTA context, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have arrived 
at similar results in two cases that implicated claims under the Cable 
Communications Policy Act (CCPA), which provides that a “cable operator 
shall destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no 
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected and there are no 
pending requests or orders for access [by the subscriber] or pursuant to a court 
order.”175  In the Eighth Circuit case, plaintiff and class representative 
Braitberg alleged that defendant Charter Communications’s failure to destroy 
customers’ personally identifiable information after they had canceled their 
subscriptions was a “direct invasion of [customers’] federally protected 
privacy rights.”176  Plaintiffs contended that this violation of a statutory right 
alone was enough to qualify as an injury in fact, but the Eighth Circuit found 
that argument unconvincing and instead stated that Spokeo had “superseded” 
two earlier circuit decisions that seemed to support Braitberg’s position.177  
The court denied standing on the ground that Braitberg had “identifie[d] no 
material risk of harm” from Charter Communications’s retention of the data 
and further commented that the common law recognized no harm emerging 
from the company retaining information it had obtained lawfully.178 
The Seventh Circuit borrowed from Braitberg and its own precedent in 
Meyers in denying standing for a putative class action that also alleged CCPA 
violations in Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.179  Despite denying 
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standing, the court, as in Braitberg, went out of its way to say that 
“[v]iolations of rights of privacy are actionable,” even if the plaintiff in this 
particular case could go no further.180  The plaintiff in Gubala had not alleged 
that Time Warner had “ever given away or leaked or lost any of his personal 
information or intends to give it away or is at risk of having the information 
stolen from it.”181  Nor did Gubala say that he “fear[ed] that Time Warner 
w[ould] give away the information and it w[ould] be used to harm him.”182  
Presumably, if the plaintiff had asserted any or some combination of these 
privacy interests, the court might at least have been more willing to let him 
proceed.  But, the court said, “he hasn’t said any of that.”183 
2.  Protection for Claims with Common Law Analogues 
In cases where courts have been able to identify a privacy interest, or an 
intersection of privacy interests, that have historically been recognized by the 
courts, the courts have found sufficient injury for standing purposes. 
a.  Driver’s Privacy Protection Act Cases 
The Eighth Circuit’s denial of an invasion of a privacy interest in Braitberg 
sufficient to confer standing can be contrasted with its holdings in Shambour 
v. Carver County184 and Heglund v. Aitkin County,185 cases decided nearly 
three weeks apart and in which standing was found for plaintiffs who alleged 
violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).186  The DPPA 
“restricts the use and distribution of personal information contained in motor-
vehicle records.”187 
In Heglund, the husband-and-wife-plaintiffs alleged that their information 
in Minnesota’s driver’s license database had been improperly accessed by 
police officers.188  The couple requested an audit of access to their 
information because they feared harassment from Jennifer Heglund’s ex-
husband, who was a Minnesota state trooper.189  The audit revealed that her 
information had been accessed 446 times over a ten-year period and that her 
current husband’s records had been accessed thirty-four times between 2006 
and 2013.190  The defendants, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, argued that 
Jennifer Heglund’s “professed anxiety from knowing that [an officer] 
improperly accessed her personal information is not sufficiently concrete to 
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constitute an injury in fact.”191  The court disagreed.  It explicitly 
distinguished Braitberg and found that “[a]n individual’s control of 
information concerning her person—the privacy interest the Heglunds claim 
here—was a cognizable interest at common law.”192  The Heglund court 
explained this different outcome by drawing a line between the privacy 
interest it identified as legitimate here, and “the lack of comparable tradition 
of suits for retaining information lawfully obtained” that seemed to form the 
basis for the plaintiff’s claim in Braitberg.193 
In Shambour, the second of these two Eighth Circuit DPPA cases, the 
plaintiff alleged that her driver’s records had been accessed fifty-nine times 
over an eight-year period.194  A former law enforcement officer, Shambour 
alleged that “her appearance [had] ‘changed noticeably’ since her time as an 
officer” and “hypothesized that individuals viewed her record out of romantic 
attraction or curiosity about the changes in her appearance.”195  Finding that 
the plaintiff’s claims could not be distinguished from those in Heglund, the 
court held that she had standing for her DPPA claims.196 
b.  Fair Credit Reporting Act Cases 
Two cases examining standing for FCRA claims serve to further 
demonstrate the privacy interests courts have identified and explain that the 
invasion of these interests constitutes an injury under a Spokeo analysis. 
The FCRA cases present two apparently dissimilar fact patterns—the first 
involves allegedly stolen laptops, and the second concerns Spokeo on remand 
from the Supreme Court.  In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data 
Breach Litigation,197 the Third Circuit weighed standing for plaintiffs who 
alleged, after the theft of two laptops holding sensitive personal information, 
that defendant Horizon had provided inadequate protection for their personal 
information.198  There, the court found that Congress had, through the FCRA, 
“create[d] a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal information.”199  
The court stated that, “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of 
information” can rise to the level of a cognizable injury.200  Although 
Horizon’s actions would not in themselves necessarily generate a cause of 
action under common law,201 the court noted that Congress had, in FCRA, 
“established that the unauthorized dissemination of personal information by 
a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself.”202 
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Analyzing Robins’s claims on remand (and citing In re Horizon), the Ninth 
Circuit similarly emphasized that the pairing between a harm defined by 
Congress in statute and one long recognized in the courts does not have to be 
an exact match.203  “Even if there are differences between FCRA’s cause of 
action and those recognized at common law, the relevant point is that 
Congress has chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely similar 
in kind to others that have traditionally served as the basis for lawsuit.”204  In 
Robins’s case, the Ninth Circuit said that “[c]ourts have long entertained 
causes of action to vindicate intangible harms caused by certain untruthful 
disclosures about individuals”205 and that in FCRA Congress had applied that 
principle to a perceived risk of harm206 that could arise in the context of credit 
reporting.207 
c.  Video Privacy Protection Act Cases 
Finally, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have discerned a close relationship 
between traditional causes of action and VPPA claims in In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litigation208 and Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc.209  
The Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon—a consolidated class action that 
alleged that Google and Viacom unlawfully collected data from the plaintiffs, 
children under age thirteen, including the videos they watched and websites 
they visited210—held that Spokeo did nothing to deny the plaintiffs standing 
and that the alleged harm included a “de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful 
disclosure of legally protected information.”211  The court did not pair the 
alleged harm with a specific common law analogue but instead seemingly 
blended the congressional and historical inquiries.  It stated, “Congress has 
long provided plaintiffs with the right to seek redress for unauthorized 
disclosures of information that, in Congress’s judgment, ought to remain 
private.”212 
The Eleventh Circuit took greater pains to point out the nearness of the 
VPPA claims alleged to a common law harm in Perry.213  The plaintiff in 
this case brought suit under the VPPA alleging that, after he downloaded the 
CNN app to his phone in 2013, the app collected information on his viewing 
activity without his knowledge and unlawfully disclosed his personally 
identifiable information.214  The Eleventh Circuit analogized to the elements 
 
 203. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. For example, in introducing the FCRA, lawmakers recounted the story of a man who 
was never able to obtain credit even after he had been exonerated of a crime. 115 CONG. REC. 
2411–12 (1969). 
 207. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1115. 
 208. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 209. 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 210. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 267. 
 211. Id. at 274. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Perry, 854 F.3d at 1340–41. 
 214. Id. at 1338–39. 
2018] THE HUNT FOR PRIVACY HARMS 2463 
of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and further noted that “Supreme Court 
precedent has recognized in the privacy context that an individual has an 
interest in preventing disclosure of personal information.”215  The court held 
that Perry had “satisfied the concreteness requirement of Article III standing, 
[by] alleg[ing] a violation of the VPPA for a wrongful disclosure.”216 
B.  The Problems with Common Law Analogues 
Because of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Spokeo that lower courts 
should consider both the “judgment of Congress” and any “close 
relationship” to a harm historically recognized in the law,217 courts have 
scrutinized how closely an alleged harm resembles one recognized at 
common law or otherwise in the English and American legal traditions.  One 
potential problem with this closeness analysis is that it leaves to individual 
judges the framing of the alleged harm and the question of whether it has the 
“feel”218 of a traditionally recognized harm.  And so, in the cases since 
Spokeo, courts can be seen engaging in this closeness inquiry with varying 
degrees of precision, sometimes naming specific privacy torts, other common 
law causes of action like libel,219 or “a right of individual privacy.”220  These 
courts are not interpreting Spokeo to require them to draw a precise line from 
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a privacy harm Congress has identified to one that has a long history in the 
courts.  One district court has stated that defendants seeking to challenge 
plaintiffs’ standing should not misinterpret Spokeo as requiring that the 
privacy interest protected by statute be precisely the same as one protected 
by a common law privacy harm for if that was necessary, there would be little 
use for the statute.221 
C.  Can Braitberg and Heglund Be Reconciled? 
A comparison of Braitberg and Heglund sheds light on some of the 
concerns courts bring to bear when applying Spokeo to an alleged privacy 
injury.  Perhaps most significantly, these two cases—in which different 
statutes were at issue—also demonstrate how the way in which the parties 
and court frame the potential common law analogue can influence the 
outcome of the standing analysis. 
Both the DPPA and the CCPA contain provisions aimed at ensuring that 
the information in question is used only for the purpose for which it was 
collected, absent consent for a new use.222  In Braitberg, the CCPA imposed 
what the plaintiff alleged was “a duty to destroy personally identifiable 
information” and, the plaintiff alleged, the defendant violated this duty “by 
retaining certain information longer than the company should have kept 
it.”223  The alleged injury in Heglund was that the repeated improper access 
of the plaintiffs’ records had “invad[ed] Jennifer’s privacy.”224  In both cases, 
the plaintiffs took action before filing suit to ascertain whether there had been 
some allegedly unlawful treatment of their information—that it had been 
improperly retained or wrongfully accessed.225 
But the circuit’s opinions diverged when they sought a common law 
analogue.  The Braitberg court determined that “retention of information 
lawfully obtained . . . without further disclosure” has not traditionally been 
recognized in American courts, while the Heglund court stated that “[a]n 
individual’s control of information concerning her person . . . was a 
cognizable interest at common law.”226 
There are other concerns that have traditionally formed important 
subcurrents in privacy discourse that, if not explicitly relied upon in the 
Heglund court’s rationale, nevertheless merit mention in the opinion, 
including that the alleged wrongful access implicated law enforcement 
personnel and that the plaintiff “professed anxiety” about the suspected 
access.227  While the court does not say that these facts in the case led to its 
identification of a privacy harm and concrete injury, both the sense of an 
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emotional harm228 and the potential abuse of government authority to violate 
a protected privacy interest229 have historically been important perimeter 
markers for privacy harms. 
III.  TIME TO RETHINK THE NATURE OF PRIVACY INJURIES 
This Part suggests that Spokeo’s instruction that courts should look to 
whether an alleged intangible injury bears close comparison to a traditionally 
recognized harm has opened an unanticipated opportunity to reinvigorate 
discussion in the federal judiciary about the nature of privacy harms.230  The 
efficacy of agency and administrative enforcement of privacy statutes has 
been questioned,231 and the courts, adjudicating suits brought by private 
individuals, may prove to be an important force in regulating privacy 
infringements caused by information technology.232  If courts do not embrace 
this role and instead do more to limit private causes of action in federal 
privacy statutes through the vehicle of standing, they will further defang the 
few protections individuals have in the data economy.233  As matters now 
stand, companies with vast stores of data often face little in the way of 
substantive repercussions when those data are breached.234  Without the 
potential for private enforcement, privacy statutes run the risk of becoming 
congressional dead letters, “mere suggestions.”235  This Part proposes one 
way courts can prevent that outcome, while staying safely within the 
framework of Spokeo. 
Part III.A argues—drawing from a substantial body of scholarship 
developed by Daniel Solove, Ryan Calo, Danielle Citron, Neil Richards, and 
others—that Prosser’s four privacy torts are, on their own, inadequate to 
 
 228. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 213; see also M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of 
Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1145 (2011). 
 229. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967). 
 230. This Note takes no position on whether a plaintiff should have to show more than a 
statutory violation; that is, it does not seek to answer the question of “statutory standing.”  This 
Note rather proceeds on the observable fact that lower courts are searching for analogues for 
alleged privacy injuries and offers suggestions for courts pursuing that inquiry. 
 231. Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 26–31 
(2008); Austin H. Krist, Note, Large-Scale Enforcement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and 
the Role of State Attorneys General, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2311, 2324 (2015). 
 232. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court to Settle Major Cellphone Privacy 
Case, REUTERS (June 5, 2017, 9:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
mobilephone/u-s-supreme-court-to-settle-major-cellphone-privacy-case-idUSKBN18W1RY 
[https://perma.cc/T88D-UFAG]; Jill Priluck, How Courts Avoid Ruling on Issues of Privacy, 
SLATE (Apr. 11, 2017, 5:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/ 
2017/04/how_courts_avoid_ruling_on_issues_of_technology_and_privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/R5BF-EYYD]. 
 233. One scholar has already observed that “the trend in federal privacy statutes has been 
to undercut the interests of individuals in protecting privacy rights.” De Armond, supra note 
231, at 45. 
 234. See Robert Hackett, How Much Do Data Breaches Cost Big Companies?:  Shockingly 
Little, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/how-much-do-data-breaches-
actually-cost-big-companies-shockingly-little/ [https://perma.cc/4TMR-S437]. 
 235. De Armond, supra note 231, at 35. 
2466 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
provide legal redress for harms generated by the data economy.  Part III.B 
then encourages courts to employ a nexus approach to assess the concreteness 
of privacy harms, an approach that satisfies Spokeo while at the same time 
unchaining courts from the overworked privacy torts.  Finally, Part III.C 
emphasizes the extent to which privacy harms arising from new technology 
have been topics of considerable concern both to the public and the Supreme 
Court in recent years. 
A.  Privacy Torts Are Ill Matched to New Harms 
Scholars have remarked that the privacy torts that sprang from Warren and 
Brandeis’s collaboration, and that were systematized by Prosser, are poorly 
suited to the challenges presented by changing forms of technology.236  One 
scholar has noted how the torts are often defined partly by reference to 
protected spaces237—for example, intrusion upon seclusion—but this 
approach runs up against its limits where technology has blurred traditional 
legal boundaries.  Professor Citron has urged courts to “take cues from 
privacy tort law’s intellectual history to ensure its continued vitality.”238  She 
urges courts to do this by revisiting the emphasis Warren and Brandeis put 
on the right of privacy as protecting an individual’s “inviolate 
personality.”239  Professor Sarah Ludington has proposed a novel tort for the 
misuse of personal information that takes guidance from both the existing 
privacy torts and privacy legislation.240  The judicial reluctance to continue 
the development of the privacy torts over the past century241 has only served 
to exacerbate the need for new consideration of what privacy harms the law 
should recognize. 
Part III.A.1 argues that, while the privacy torts may be useful to courts 
looking to identify sufficiently concrete privacy injuries for standing 
purposes, Spokeo does not limit their search to the four privacy torts.  Part 
III.A.2 lays out some more recent conceptualizations of privacy injury 
proposed by scholars. 
1.  Spokeo Does Not Bind Courts to Privacy Torts 
The Supreme Court’s instruction in Spokeo to consider whether an alleged 
intangible harm bears a relation to one traditionally recognized by the courts 
does not require the courts to hew so closely to the four traditional privacy 
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torts when considering the concreteness of an injury asserted under a statute 
implicating a privacy interest.  In other words, that the plaintiff asserts a harm 
to a privacy interest does not mean the harm must itself bear a close 
relationship to a traditional privacy tort.  Both the Ninth and Third Circuits 
have emphasized that Spokeo does not require an exact match.242  One district 
court, in a decision cited by several others,243 has further emphasized that 
Spokeo’s concreteness analysis does not require that the harm with which a 
closeness is identified be “of any particular jurisdiction” and further stated 
that the analogous harm does not need to be one that, if alleged 
independently, would give rise to a viable tort claim.244 
This degree of discretion courts can employ in searching out analogues for 
alleged privacy harms seems particularly appropriate, as determinations 
concerning what interests deserve privacy protection are always normative 
and culturally conditioned.245  Privacy is contextual.246  Courts should look 
beyond the privacy torts to other privacy-related interests historically 
protected by the courts to allow plaintiffs to pass the standing bar drawn by 
Spokeo, both out of deference to separation-of-powers principles—which 
undergird standing as a doctrine247—and to give vitality to privacy claims. 
This would serve separation-of-powers principles because it would help 
the courts give meaningful effect to the statutes Congress has enacted.  The 
decision by Congress to include a private right of action when a privacy 
concern is at stake represents a purposeful and reasoned decision by the 
legislature.  Neither the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) nor the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), both of which 
implicate privacy concerns, contains an explicit private right of action.248  
Courts, including the Supreme Court, reviewing the legislative histories of 
statutes such as the FCRA,249 the VPPA,250 the TCPA,251 and the DPPA252 
have found that Congress, as the nation’s deliberative and legislative body, 
was responding to specific privacy concerns and intended to regulate certain 
privacy-infringing behavior. 
Furthermore, undue adherence to Prosser’s privacy torts leads to an 
incomplete picture of the range of privacy harms that have historically been 
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recognized by the law.  Eavesdropping was a crime at common law.253  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and “the constitutional right to information 
privacy [and] evidentiary privileges”254 all fall under the umbrella of privacy 
law.  The protection of privacy afforded by anonymous speech has long been 
an important part of American public life and has been described by the Court 
as “a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”255  Holding the courts to the 
four privacy torts in their search for analogues misrepresents the privacy 
concerns sown broadly across the landscape of American law. 
2.  Novel Conceptions of Privacy Injury Have Been Proposed 
While courts have been slow since Prosser to delineate new privacy 
wrongs, scholars have engaged in robust discussion of what constitutes an 
injury to privacy and what forms of privacy harm should be legally 
cognizable.  Instead of being amorphous and merely motivated by an “ick” 
factor, one professor has described privacy harms as “unique injur[ies] with 
specific boundaries and characteristics.”256  Professor Citron has argued that 
courts can look to the seventy years preceding Prosser’s work as a way to 
revitalize their privacy inquiries.257  Richards has argued for rights of 
“intellectual privacy” that are founded on the First Amendment and that 
protect “our reading, our communications, and our expressive dealings with 
others.”258  Another commentator has suggested, drawing on fiduciary law, 
that courts could impose a duty to secure the information they obtain on “data 
confidants.”259  Writing together, Solove and Citron have noted that, in the 
context of harms resulting from data breaches, courts are presented with 
opportunities to read precedents “flexibly and creatively”—but seldom seize 
that chance.260 
The intellectual groundwork laid by these scholars stands ready to assist 
courts prepared to investigate more deeply new forms of privacy harm that 
arise from the widespread collection and retention of data. 
B.  A Nexus of Privacy Interests Is Sufficient 
Few of the plaintiffs in the cases discussed in this Note appear to have 
asserted anything so broad as the “right to be let alone”261 that famously 
motivated the Warren-Brandeis conception of privacy and that spurred the 
development of privacy law in America.262  Rather, plaintiffs suing under 
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privacy statutes seem to act on the basis of a more narrow principle:  that 
when society, through Congress, has circumscribed certain interactions as 
subject to privacy protections, individuals should be able to sue for redress 
when they personally suffer infringements of those interests.  This Part 
proposes a way that federal courts, working within the framework laid out by 
Spokeo, can conceptualize those alleged injuries in the context of standing. 
In order to grant plaintiffs the benefit of the few existing privacy 
protections in statute, courts employing Spokeo’s standing analysis for the 
concreteness of intangible harms should apply a nexus approach that looks 
beyond the privacy torts in assessing whether plaintiffs have adequately 
established injury in fact.  They should look for significant overlapping 
privacy concerns that have historically been recognized by the courts.  
Instead of seeking a perfect tort analogue to an alleged privacy injury and 
dismissing for lack of standing if no perfect analogue exists, lower courts 
should find that such a nexus of implicated privacy interests is sufficient to 
give concreteness to the alleged injury. 
The cases in Part II illustrate how, to some extent, this is already what 
courts are doing when they find privacy harms.263  But because of the 
potential for confusion and uncertainty that surrounds privacy, the 
insufficiency of the privacy torts, and the potential for privacy-adverse judges 
to frame a privacy interest so as to not recognize a common law analogue,264 
the courts should shift to an approach that finds that a nexus of privacy 
interests is sufficient.  Such a nexus may be formed by the intersection of the 
varied privacy-related interests long recognized by the law, including the 
involvement of law enforcement in the alleged injury, emotional distress, or 
other conjunctions of privacy-implicated concerns that in and of themselves 
would not give rise to a cause of action. 
This approach would help courts recognize privacy harms as Warren and 
Brandeis, and the opinions they drew on, found such harms—unnamed but 
nevertheless present.265  An approach that recognizes a nexus of privacy 
concerns as sufficient to establish concreteness for purposes of injury in fact 
would also go further toward respecting the separation-of-powers principles 
that serve as the constitutional underpinnings for the standing doctrine.266  To 
restrict Congress to the identification only of harms that look like older harms 
would be an improper judicial interference with the legislative power vested 
in Article I of the Constitution, quite apart from the practical difficulties sure 
to result from strictly restraining federal courts to the harms that would have 
been familiar to their judicial ancestors in “the courts at Westminster.”267 
This nexus approach, which finds a new privacy interest where several 
traditional privacy concerns overlap, especially when the area within that 
nexus has been elevated by a statute, best respects the interests both of 
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privacy law and of the constitutional, separation-of-powers justifications for 
standing.  It allows courts to identify injuries similar to those with which their 
competency is long settled, while simultaneously not hampering Congress’s 
power to respond to new forms of harm. 
C.  Supreme Court and Public Are Both Concerned with Privacy 
Privacy harms are a growing area of legal concern that courts should not 
ignore.  As the Ninth Circuit recently observed, “[t]he modern information 
age has shined a spotlight on information privacy.”268  Outside of the legal 
arena, Pierre Omidyar, a prominent technology billionaire who founded 
eBay, wrote in the Washington Post that he fears that, “[f]or all the ways this 
technology brings us together, the monetization and manipulation of 
information is swiftly tearing us apart.”269  The United States saw 1091 data 
breaches in 2016, a 40 percent increase over the previous year.270 
The Supreme Court has recognized the manner in which changes in 
technology can result in new forms of harm to privacy interests.271  In 2011, 
in the course of striking down a Vermont law that restricted the sale of 
prescriber data to pharmaceutical marketers, the Court in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc.272 said that the “capacity of technology to find and publish 
personal information . . . presents serious and unresolved issues with respect 
to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”273  Little has been 
done since to address that threat to privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo added new difficulty to the 
already considerable challenges privacy plaintiffs face.  As businesses built 
on the commodification of personal information expand, the privacy torts, 
long starved for judicial attention, have proven ill equipped to the regulation 
of this widespread economic activity, with its attendant potential for harms.  
Should the federal courts, through the vehicle of standing, remove themselves 
from the adjudication of novel privacy harms, even when redress for such 
harms has been provided for by Congress, there will be little incentive for 
companies to avoid such harms, and private individuals will be left without 
a remedy. 
The approach proposed by this Note accords with the Court’s instructions 
in Spokeo for testing the concreteness of intangible harms and would allow 
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plaintiffs to pursue the remedies Congress has afforded them in privacy 
statutes.  This approach properly respects the separation-of-powers rationale 
that the Supreme Court has said rests at the core of standing, and it helps 
ensure that courts retain their important role as protectors of private 
individuals’ rights in a shifting economic landscape by giving force and 
meaning to the privacy protections Congress has enacted. 
 
